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Abstract: From a cursory look at the terms of service of the main social networking websites, it is 
immediately possible to detect that Facebook’s show a peculiar configuration. Although they represent 
a mere contract between private parties, these terms adopt the traditional jargon of constitutional texts, 
and articulate their contents in terms of rights, principles, and duties. This curious pairing between norms 
regulating social media and the constitutional sphere is also apparent in a series of non-binding 
documents that are unequivocally named ‘bill of rights’, and seek to articulate a set of principles to 
protect social media users. This paper examines whether the emergence of a constitutional tone in this 
limited number of texts could be related to the effective, or aspirational, constitutional function that 
these documents exercise. The identification of a series of significant shortcomings will lead to exclude 
that social media’s terms of service and bills of rights of social media users currently play a 
constitutionalising role. Nevertheless, the possibility to theoretically justify the use of these documents 
as mechanisms of constitutionalisation in the social media environment will be adduced as an evidence 
of the potential constitutional aspirations of these texts. 
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‘More than 175 million people use Facebook. If it were a country, it would be the sixth most 
populated country in the world. Our terms aren’t just a document that protect our rights; it’s the 
governing document for how the service is used by everyone across the world.’  
Zuckerberg in Zittrain 2009 
 
1. Introduction 
Almost a decade ago, Mark Zuckerberg compared Facebook to a populated country (Zuckerberg in J 
Zittrain 2009). Today, a similar association would no longer be valid: in 2017 the number of active 
Facebook’s users surpassed 2 billion (Statista 2018), going well beyond the number of inhabitants of 
the most populated countries in the world (see, e.g., National Bureau of Statistics of China 2018). 
Nevertheless, one has the impression that these new figures even reinforce the validity of this 
metaphor of Facebook as a big state: an entity with its own territory, the platform; its own population, 
the users; and of course its own law, the terms of service. 
In the words of Zuckerberg, as quoted above, one can perceive a rhetoric tone used to talk about the 
platform’s terms of service. From a legal point of view, these terms are merely a contract between 
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private actors; nevertheless, one has the impression that Facebook’s CEO wants to present them as 
the fundamental law protecting users’ rights universally. Admittedly, one has a similar feeling by 
directly reading Facebook’s terms, or, more precisely, its ‘Statement of Rights and Responsibilities’ 
(Facebook 2018a). In fact, they list a decalogue of ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’, and refer to Facebook’s 
Principles, a document in which the expression ‘you’, i.e. the users, is even replaced with the more 
generic denominations ‘People’ and ‘Every Person’ (Facebook 2018b). 
Moreover, this peculiar pairing of norms regulating social media and the constitutional sphere does 
not seem to be an isolated occurrence. This is also apparent in a series of recently emerged documents 
that are unequivocally named: ‘Bill of Rights for Users of the Social Web’ (Smarr et al. 2007), ‘Social 
Network Users’ Bill of Rights’ (Pincus 2010), ‘Bills of Privacy Rights for Social Network Users’ 
(Electronic Frontier Foundation 2010), and ‘Bill of Rights for Social Network Users’ (Ello 2015). 
These texts, which this paper will generally call bills of rights of social media users, do not have any 
binding legal value, simply being the output of single individuals, or non-governmental organisations. 
However, their content aims to articulate a series of rights of social media users and obligations of 
social media platforms in a way that clearly echoes traditional constitutional instruments. 
In light of this phenomenon, one could cynically consider the adoption of, what this paper calls, a 
‘constitutional tone’ by these documents as a mere ‘legal talisman’ (Albert 2016), a way of 
legitimising the arbitrariness of social media’s governance, or even a simple instrument of marketing, 
taking advantage of the common positive preconceptions linked to the idea of constitution (Herrman 
2017). Or, conversely, one could think that it rather reflects the fact that these texts effectively play, 
or wish to play, a constitutional function in the social media environment.  
It would be eventually possible to discover that this constitutional tone is in reality generated by a 
mixture of these reasons. However, fully disentangling this knot is certainly beyond the possibilities 
of a legal investigation. The scope of this paper will be more limited. In particular, it will consider 
whether these documents represent, or wish to represent, mechanisms of constitutionalisation in the 
social media environment.  
This paper will be structured in the following way. The second section will illustrate, in detail, the 
phenomenon of the adoption of a constitutional tone in Facebook’s terms of service and in the bills 
of rights of social media users.  
The third section will tackle the question of whether social media’s terms of service and the bills of 
rights of social media users represent mechanisms of constitutionalisation in the social media 
environment. This investigation will build on the existing scholarship which analysed private actors’ 
self-regulation (Suzor 2016a; Mayer-Schönberger and Crowley 2006; Teubner 2012) and the bills of 
rights of social media users (Gill, Redeker, and Gasser 2015; Yilma 2017) from a constitutional 
perspective. In line with this literature, it will be argued that both instruments could theoretically 
perform the quintessential constitutional functions of protecting fundamental rights and balancing the 
powers involved. However, it will be shown that a series of shortcomings undermines the ability of 
these documents to concretely act as effective mechanisms of constitutionalisation.  
Lastly, the fourth section will explain why a potential process of constitutionalisation relying on 
social media’s terms of service and bills of rights of social media users could nonetheless be 
envisaged in the future. To this end, this paper will draw on the set of theories generally known under 
the name of ‘global constitutionalism’, and, in particular, it will adapt Anne Peter’s conception of 
‘compensatory constitutionalism’ (Peters 2006) to the context of social media’s constitutionalisation. 
It will be contended that these documents could be regarded as compensatory counteractions to the 
failure of state-centric constitutional instruments to provide an answer to the challenges of the social 
media environment. In this way, this paper will argue that the adoption of a constitutional tone could 
reflect the aspirations of these documents to embody such a compensatory trend.  
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2. The adoption of a constitutional tone  
With the expression ‘constitutional tone’, this paper refers to the use of the traditional jargon of 
constitutional texts, and to the adoption of the peculiar configuration that articulates contents in terms 
of rights, principles and duties. The emergence of a constitutional tone in documents related to the 
social media environment represents a limited phenomenon. At the moment, it appears that only 
Facebook’s terms of service, among the main social networking websites, and four bills of rights of 
social media users possess such a characteristic. However, no evidence allows us to exclude such a 
phenomenon, as it can be observed today, as representing the beginning of new slowly rising trend. 
 
2.1 Facebook’s terms of service 
From a cursory look at the terms of service of the main social networking websites,1 it is immediately 
possible to detect that Facebook’s show a peculiar configuration. Facebook is the only social 
networking website that denominates its terms as the ‘Statement of Rights and Responsibilities’ 
(Facebook 2018a), an expression that echoes the national constitutional dimension in which rights 
and responsibilities of citizens are established.  
At the outset of the document, Facebook declares that the Statement ‘derives from the Facebook 
Principles’. The latter represents a separate document in which Facebook condenses ten principles 
that should guide its actions towards its ultimate goal, namely ‘to make the world more open and 
transparent’ (Facebook 2018b). Facebook’s decalogue is quite comprehensive, and includes:  
a) a series of freedoms:  to share information, to connect online, to access information, to 
build trust and reputation; and 
b) a series of people’s rights: to own their information, to set privacy control, to have 
practical tools to share and access information, to be equally treated on Facebook, not to 
be removed from Facebook, to have open platforms and standards, to have free access to 
Facebook, to have rights and responsibilities written in a separate statement, to have rights 
and responsibilities consistent with Facebook Principles, to participate in the redaction of 
the Principles or of the Statement, to have a unique Facebook service open to everyone 
worldwide.  
The Statement addresses its rules to ‘you’ or ‘we’, as in the terms of service of the other analysed 
social networks, while, as anticipated in the introduction, the Principles address more generally 
‘Every Person’ or the ‘People’, as if certain norms were established for the world in its universality, 
and regardless of the use of Facebook as a medium of communication (see Facebook 2018b, 
especially the First principle). 
Moreover, in conformity with Facebook’s ninth Principle, any amendments to the terms of service 
will be subject to the review and comment of the users (Facebook 2018b, Article 13.1). Historically, 
Facebook went even further: in 2009 the company of Menlo Park announced, for the first time, to 
give its users the opportunity not only to comment, but also to vote for the set of terms they preferred. 
At that time, indeed, the section of the Statement on amendments provided that  
If more than 7,000 users comment on the proposed change, we will also give you the 
opportunity to participate in a vote in which you will be provided alternatives. The vote shall 
be binding on us if more than 30% of all active registered users as of the date of the notice 
vote. (Zittrain 2009) 
In conclusion, contrasting to those of other social networking websites, Facebook’s terms do not 
appear as a mere contract between private parties; conversely, it is possible to perceive Facebook’s 
																																																																				
1 Facebook, Google+, Instagram, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Snapchat, Tumblr, Twitter, YouTube have been taken into account 
as a representative example of the main social networking websites. 
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willingness to give a constitutional tone to its terms. This is evident if one considers both the form 
and the content of Facebook’s terms. From a formal point of view, Facebook frees its terms from the 
characteristic verbiage of private agreements to adopt the traditional jargon of constitutional law. 
From a substantive point of view, Facebook adapts traditional constitutional principles, such as 
freedom of expression or the right to privacy and data protection, to the context of its platform. Last, 
but not least, it suggests an idea of ‘democracy-ness’ by allowing users to participate in the process 
of definition of the terms.  
 
2.2 Bills of rights of social media users 
In a working paper of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society published in November 2015, Lex 
Gill, Dennis Redeker, and Urs Gasser identified four documents seeking to establish a ‘bill of rights’ 
for the social media environment: namely, the ‘Bill of Rights for Users of the Social Web’ published 
in 2007 by Joseph Smarr et al. (https://www.template.org/?page_id=599), the ‘Social Network Users’ 
Bill of Rights’ posted in 2010 by Jon Pincus (http://www.talesfromthe.net/jon/?page_id=3017), the 
‘Bills of Privacy Rights for Social Network Users’ proposed in 2010 by the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/05/bill-privacy-rights-social-network-users), and 
the ‘Bill of Rights for Social Network Users’ promoted in 2015 by the social network Ello 
(https://bill-of-rights.ello.co). 
These documents do not have any legal value; they were simply published in the last ten years by 
individuals or by non-governmental organisations. In a similar way to Facebook’s Statement of 
Rights and Responsibilities, they adopt a jargon which is unequivocally associated with the 
constitutional dimension; for instance, all four texts are entitled ‘bill of rights’. These texts do not 
seek to articulate a general list of constitutional principles, but they are issue-specific (Gill et al. 
2015). As is evident from their title, their scope of application is limited to the social media 
environment, and in particular, they focus on the dimension of the social media users.   
Such a limited scope of application from a material and personal point of view also influences the 
content of these documents. According to Gill et al. ‘the rights articulated by such documents tend to 
be thematically in line with what Todd Davies has described as “user data freedoms”’ (2015: 12). 
Davies derived ten principles, each one articulated in different freedoms and rights, from an empirical 
analysis of several proposals of ‘users’ bills of rights’ (2014). Lastly, at a substantive level, they not 
only establish a series of rights from the perspective of users, but, in parallel, also tend to impose 
obligations on private platforms. 
In conclusion, the bills of rights of social media users manifestly present a constitutional tone. They 
both embrace the traditional terminology of constitutional texts, and configure their content in terms 
of rights, principles, and duties. 
 
3. New mechanisms of constitutionalisation? 
In this paper, the concept of ‘constitutionalisation’ designates the ‘process of the emergence, creation, 
and identification of constitution-like elements’ within a given legal order (Peters 2006: 582). This 
notion has been employed in several areas of law, with special attention accorded in recent years in 
the fields of EU law, and international law (Weiler and Wind 2003; Peters 2006).  
Notoriously, the definitions of ‘constitution’ are multifarious. This paper has adopted the one that 
Anne Peters defines as ‘legitimist’, and considers the narrowest (Peters 2006: 585). This notion of 
constitution echoes the text of Article 16 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen of 1789, which states that ‘[a]ny society in which no provision is made for guaranteeing rights 
or for the separation of powers, has no Constitution’ (Conseil constitutionnel 2018). Therefore, 
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according to this interpretation, the notion of constitution is defined by its two quintessential 
functions, namely, the protection of fundamental rights and the balancing of powers. 
Therefore, in order to shed light on the constitutional nature of these documents, this section 
examines, in turn, the extent to which social media’s bills of rights and bills of rights of social media 
users are able to perform the two quintessential constitutional functions of protecting fundamental 
rights and balancing the powers of the actors involved. Relying on the scholarship which studied 
these documents from a constitutional perspective, it will be contended that both the terms of service 
and the bills of rights could theoretically represent mechanisms of constitutionalisation in the social 
media environment. Nevertheless, it will be shown that a series of potential shortcomings undermines 
the chances of these documents to concretely act as such. In this way, this section will demonstrate 
that the adoption of a constitutional tone is not determined by a constitutional function that the terms 
of service and the bills of rights effectively play in the social media environment.  
 
3.1 Social media’s terms of service as a means of self-constraint 
In a recent paper focusing on the governance of online platforms, Nicolas Suzor argued that social 
media’s terms of service in fact regulate the distribution of power ‘like constitutional documents’, 
even if, from a formal point of view, they are merely contracts between private parties (2016a: 3).  
The identification of the balancing of powers as the main constitutional function performed by the 
rules of specific subsystems of the digital environment is confirmed by other scholars. In particular, 
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and John Crowley detected a phenomenon of constitutionalisation in the 
adoption of ‘voluntarily constraining norms in virtual spaces through norms of a real-world 
jurisdiction’ (2006: 1809). These scholars defined the decision of Linden Lab to recognise real 
intellectual property rights in its users’ creations as a ‘constitutional moment’ (2006: 1809). A key 
constitutional element was found in the willingness of the virtual world software to ‘[constrain] its 
future behaviour through its own decision’ (2006: 1809).  
Drawing a parallel with virtual world software, these observations allow us to confirm and further 
specify the qualification of social media’s terms of service as a potential mechanism of 
constitutionalisation. Indeed, it is possible to understand that these documents represent the output of 
a dominant actor, such as private companies are in the social media environment, and that, therefore, 
they conceptually denote an operation of self-constraint, which is typical of political constitutions 
(Teubner 2012).  
The constitutional function of the self-regulation of a dominant actor is also confirmed by Gunther 
Teubner in the context of specialised transnational regimes (2012). He argued that transnational 
organisations, such as ICANN and the WTO, are emerging as competing dominant actors beside the 
state. For this reason, these entities would tend to ‘[develop] the properties of a collective actor that 
is similar to the state’ (2012: 67), including establishing their own constitution. 
In conclusion, social media’s terms of service could theoretically perform a constitutional function. 
In fact, by limiting the possibilities of action of social media companies, they could be regarded as 
the instrument of self-regulation of a dominant actor in the social media environment.  
 
3.1.1 Implications 
Undoubtedly, the use of social media’s terms of service as a mechanism of constitutionalisation 
appears to be a promising solution if regarded in terms of its operability. Social media’s terms of 
service are an instrument already in place, which is legally binding on the parties involved, and that 
can be easily adapted to serve this new constitutional purpose. However, at the same time, a series of 
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issues undermines the functionality of the terms of service as a new mechanism of 
constitutionalisation.  
 
a) Democratic issues 
Firstly, it is important to heed the admonishment made by Mayer-Schönberger and Crowley in their 
analysis of constitutionalisation of virtual worlds: ‘Linden Lab provided a constitutional moment, not 
a democratic one’ (2006: 1809). Constitutionalisation by private companies’ self-constraint is not a 
synonym of democratisation. Facebook’s attitude in relation to the possibility to amend its terms is 
exemplary in this context: in 2009, Facebook felt the need to increase democratic participation in its 
governance by offering its users the possibility to vote on its new terms of service (Zittrain 2009), but 
today, as the Statement shows, this power is no longer offered. From this example, it is possible to 
understand that a constitutionalisation through social media’s self-constraint does not automatically 
imply a fully democratic governance, and, consequently, still exposes users to the arbitrariness of 
social media’s choice. In such a way, these actors retain the possibility to tighten and loosen their 
constraint as often as they please, and without any control from their users (Suzor 2016b). 
 
b) Intrinsic bias 
Secondly, constitutionalisation through social media’s self-constraint does not effectively guarantee 
a fair balance of powers. Suzor argues that social media’s terms of service often grant power to the 
platforms, without nevertheless limiting it (2016a). It is evident here that the problem lies in the fact 
that social media companies are, at the same time, the authors and the subjects of their own rules. 
This is again the old Platonic issue of who guards the guardians: any attempt of balancing these 
powers would be intrinsically biased in favour of social media platforms, and subject to their potential 
review. 
 
c) Limited protection 
Thirdly, constitutionalisation through social media’s self-constraint could only partially ensure the 
quintessential constitutional function of protecting fundamental rights. In fact, the terms of service 
can guarantee fundamental rights only by limiting the power of social media companies. This implies 
that the exercise of fundamental rights based on specific terms of service is restricted to the field of 
action of a single social media company, and that it cannot be directly protected against potential 
violations of other actors involved in the social media context. For example, the terms of service 
could only indirectly delimit the extent to which advertisers, the main source of revenue in the social 
media market, can legally use users’ personal data in order to achieve their profit. However, as recent 
scandals have shown (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018), such an indirect protection against 
potential rights violations perpetrated by the advertisers could prove to be insufficient. 
 
d) Legal talisman 
Fourthly, constitutionalisation through social media’s self-constraint can be fake: a mere 
constitutional façade. This could happen when traditional notions of constitutional law are 
transplanted without any effort of translation or clarification in a sphere dominated by private 
companies, where states are no longer the primary holders of constitutional obligations (Berman 
2000). In this way, the transplanted notions risk representing what Kendra Albert calls a ‘legal 
talisman’ (2016): a way of legitimising the arbitrariness of social media’s governance, or even a 
simple instrument of marketing, taking advantage of the common positive preconceptions linked to 
the idea of constitution (Herrman 2017). 
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e) Constitutional collisions 
Lastly, constitutionalisation through social media’s self-constraint can lead to the development of a 
set of constitutional norms potentially conflicting with nation-states’ constitutions. Teubner already 
foresaw the risk of constitutional ‘collisions’ as an inevitable consequence of the constitutionalisation 
of specialised transnational regimes (2012: 151). The case of U.S. President Donald Trump’s attitude 
of blocking followers on Twitter can be exemplary. Trump tweets from his personal account in 
relation to matters linked to his official function as president. According to Twitter’s terms of service, 
he is entitled to block his followers, thus preventing them to receive the information he publishes. In 
this way, it is clear how the rules established by Twitter enter into conflict with people’s right to 
freedom of expression, enshrined in most national and supranational instruments. Indeed, by allowing 
Trump to block some of his users, Twitter could be accused of restricting the possibility of these 
individuals to receive information related to the political life of their country. This circumstance 
becomes even more serious if one thinks that some of the blocked users are journalists, generally 
considered as the ‘watchdogs of democracy’. 
In light of these shortcomings, Suzor advanced the proposal to use the principles of the rule of law as 
a parameter to test the legitimacy of the norms created by social media (2016b; Korff and Brown 
2012). He argued that a form of governance which is decentralised at the level of social media 
platforms could be necessary, but that, at the same time, the notions of state-centric constitutionalism 
could not be merely transplanted within the new context of social media. Will nation-state legislation 
be able to instil the rule of law in social media norms or will a different instrument be necessary? A 
full answer to this question cannot be provided in this paper. However, the next section will analyse 
the bills of rights of social media users, instruments that, by privileging the position of users vis-à-
vis social media companies, could theoretically be conceived to this purpose as a complementary 
constitutional instrument. 
 
3.2 The bills of rights of social media users as an expression of digital constitutionalism 
In contrast to social media’s terms of service, no interpretative effort is required to understand that 
the bills of rights of social media users could be regarded, from a theoretical point of view, as 
mechanisms of constitutionalisation in the social media environment. The original aim of these 
documents is indeed to establish the rights of the social media users (Gill et al. 2015).  
The working paper authored by Gill et al., in which the bills of rights of social media users were first 
mentioned, focused on ‘digital constitutionalism’ (2015). They proposed this denomination ‘as a 
common term to connect a constellation of initiatives that have sought to articulate a set of political 
rights, governance norms, and limitations on the exercise of power on the Internet’ (2015: 2). At first 
sight, one could think that the bills of rights of social media users were included in the category of 
initiatives analysed by the Harvard scholars. However, Gill et al. explicitly excluded these texts from 
their data set because ‘[t]hese documents are concerned with the exercise and limits on private power 
in virtual communities and private social networks, in the spirit of what Nicolas Suzor also called 
“digital constitutionalism”’ (2015: 12).  
Suzor, in his doctoral thesis, used the notion of ‘digital constitutionalism’, first introduced by Brian 
Fitzgerald (2000), to frame the issue of the regulation of powers in virtual communities (2010: 13). 
As highlighted by Kinfe Micheal Yilma (2017), the interpretations of the notion of ‘digital 
constitutionalism’ provided by Suzor, on the one hand, and Gill et al., on the other hand, are 
diametrically opposed: the first one applies the concept of constitutionalism only to the context of 
private powers, while the second ones maintain the traditional meaning of this notion as delimitation 
of ‘state’s power over its citizens’ (2015: 2, emphasis added). Yilma himself implicitly overtook this 
distinction by including in his mapping of initiatives of digital constitutionalism also the bills of rights 
of social media users (2017: 123).  
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It is the opinion of the Author that the concept of digital constitutionalism, intended as a ‘mind-set’ 
of ideas whose ultimate aim is the protection of fundamental rights and the balancing of powers in 
the digital environment (Milewicz et al. 2010), is not restricted to the limitation of state power. It is 
impossible to neglect that the whole digital environment has recently witnessed the emergence of 
private companies as a dominant power beside nation-states (Teubner 2012). Since it seems logical 
to contend that all powerful actors require an action of limitation, the notion of digital 
constitutionalism should include the limitation of both state and non-state actors. 
In conclusion, beyond the single interpretations that are admissible in such a debate, all the existing 
positions acknowledge that the bills of rights of social media users are also aimed at limiting the 
power of social media companies, and, therefore, at performing a function of balancing powers. 
 
3.2.1 Implications 
The main strength of a mechanism of constitutionalisation through social media’s self-constraint 
undoubtedly lies in its immediate operability; this solution adapts an already existing legal instrument, 
the terms of service, to limit the power of a dominant actor of the digital environment. However, at 
the same time, this option is undermined by a series of shortcomings. In particular, social media 
platforms, ultimately being private corporations, could not ensure a fully democratic participation in 
the design of the constitutional rules, and, consequently, strike a fair balance of the powers involved.  
In light of these considerations, the bills of rights of social media users could appear as a solution, in 
principle, ensuring more democratic participation, and diminishing the risk of bias. Nevertheless, also 
the operability of these potential mechanisms of constitutionalisation is impaired by a series of 
shortcomings. 
 
a) Rights inflation 
Yilma presented a series of criticisms in relation to the Internet bills of rights that are also valid in the 
social media context (2017). Firstly, he underlined a risk of rights inflation: he argued that there is no 
evidence that the existing constitutional machinery does not protect human rights, and he 
consequently questioned the desirability of other bills of rights (Jørgensen 2013; De Hert and Kloza 
2012). It is possible to generally agree with this statement, but it is important to make two 
clarifications. First, as Yilma himself recognises, the Internet bills of rights, and in particular, as we 
have seen, the bills of rights of social media users, include new rights, the so-called ‘user data 
freedoms’, deriving from a re-specification in the context of social media of general principles of 
state-centric constitutionalism. Therefore, it does not appear to be fully appropriate to talk about rights 
‘inflation’ in so far as an element of novelty is present. Second, it is worth remembering that the 
existing constitutional machinery is state-centred; consequently, fundamental rights of the users can 
be protected only at the condition that legal jurisdiction is established on the concerned social media 
company, and, in any case, only within specific physical boundaries. This implies a fragmentation of 
constitutional protection, and the impossibility to cover the full transnational dimension in which 
social media companies operate.  
 
b) Fragmentation 
Secondly, and here it is possible to fully agree with Yilma, this mechanism of constitutionalisation 
produces a fragmented and uncoordinated output, characterised by different overlapping proposals. 
For instance, it is true that each of the examples of bills of rights of social media users listed above, 
at least, does not cover a single social network; however, it is difficult to appreciate the relationships 
among them, if any.  
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c) Low normative impact 
Thirdly, Yilma suggested a problem of feasibility: he contended that these bills were proposed in 
developed Western countries, where new rights can more easily penetrate than in developing 
countries, which might present greater resistance in integrating these new principles. In reality, it is 
possible to read this circumstance in a different way. On the one hand, one could claim that there is 
an issue of democracy: since the existing bills of rights of social media users originated in developed 
Western countries, people from developing nations were underrepresented in the constituent phase. 
Consequently, this would lead to impose on the second group a series of principles essentially 
established by the first group. On the other hand, one could interpret ‘feasibility’ in the sense of 
‘normative impact’. Admittedly, this is an issue tangentially mentioned by Yilma at the outset of his 
paper: these documents of bills of rights are not legally binding texts. They represent a very weak 
mechanism of constitutionalisation: not only do they arise to protect the interests of the weakest 
actors, the users, but they also cannot rely on the power of dominant actors, like states and social 
media platforms, to ensure their application and enforcement (Jørgensen 2013; De Minico 2015). 
In conclusion, even if they could theoretically represent an answer to the shortcomings of social 
media’s self-regulation, the operability of the bills of rights for social media users as mechanisms of 
constitutionalisation is weakened by a series of significant problems.  
 
4.  Constitutional aspirations?   
The previous section has shown that a series of significant shortcomings undermines the possibility 
to regard social media’s terms of service and the bills of rights of social media users as new 
mechanisms of constitutionalisation in the social media environment. In this way, it has been 
excluded that these documents adopted a constitutional tone because they effectively exercise a 
constitutional function in such a context.  
This section will examine whether such a constitutional tone could be rather related to the fact that 
these texts aspire to act as mechanisms of constitutionalisation in the social media environment. A 
positive answer to this question will be given by arguing that the emergence of a process of 
constitutionalisation, relying on terms of service and bills of rights, could be theoretically envisaged 
and justified in the social media environment. The adoption of a global constitutionalist perspective 
will allow to identify a series of elements of the social media environment that subvert the 
constitutional equilibrium and generate constitutional counteractions both in a state-centric 
dimension as well as beyond the state. However, it will be shown that certain characteristics of the 
social media environment restrict the possibility of state-centric constitutional instruments to produce 
their own counteractions. In light of this phenomenon, it will be contended that the configuration of 
terms of service and bills of rights as new mechanisms of constitutionalisation in the social media 
environment could be justified by the necessity to compensate the failure of state-centric 
constitutional instruments in addressing the challenges of the social media environment.  
 
4.1 The advent of social media as a genesis of constitutional counteractions 
Global constitutionalism is a theory, or better, a composite set of theoretical ‘strands’, rotating around 
a central idea (Peters 2015; Schwöbel 2011). This idea is that a constitutional narrative composed of 
values such as the rule of law, the protection of fundamental rights, the balance of powers as well as 
a series of institutions or mechanisms to support these values can be detected beyond the dimension 
of nation-states, i.e. at global level (O’Donoghue 2014). This theory has been originally developed to 
reinterpret the treaties of some international organisations, such the EU (Peters 2001; Pernice 2009) 
or the WTO (Cass 2005; Petersmann 2011), as their ‘constitutions’. Subsequently, it has been used 
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as the departing point leading to variegated visions of the phenomenon of constitutionalisation 
beyond the state as well as to different research approaches or schools (Wiener et al. 2012; Deplano 
2013).  
Interestingly, this theory was recently adopted to also explain certain phenomena related to the 
Internet. Gunther Teubner argued that the Internet is an environment where the contemporary 
processes of globalisation and privatisation are challenging the state-centric constitutional framework 
(2012). Consequently, alternative processes of constitutionalisation are emerging beyond the state 
through private actors’ self-regulation (2012). Moreover, according to Teubner, these new forms of 
constitutionalisation could not succeed if they did not generalise and re-specify constitutional notions 
originating in the state-centric dimension by taking in account the peculiarities of the new 
transnational social environment (2004). 
Anne-Claire Jamart claimed that key themes of global constitutionalism, such as the recognition of 
individual rights, the limitation of power, and the rejection of inter-governmental control are 
identifiable in the recent development of Internet principles and in the consolidation of the concept 
of Internet freedom within the Internet governance context (2014). However, she lamented that the 
absence of an institutionalised framework does not yet ensure satisfying results in relation to the 
accountability of decision-makers and the enforcement of individual rights (2014). 
Ingolf Pernice contended that contemporary global challenges require a global regulatory framework; 
in this context, the Internet is seen both as the infrastructure that will empower the global community 
by increasing transparency in decision-making and providing more opportunities of democratic 
participation, and as an environment requiring itself a constitutional basis (2015). In this way, Internet 
governance offers a fertile field where ‘new forms of non-governmental norm-building processes’ 
can be experimented in the perspective to use them in the future in order to empower people and 
legitimise global governance mechanisms in a multilevel constitutional context (2015: 8). 
Andreas Fischer-Lescano argued that the traditional framework of individual rights provided by 
international law no longer suffices to face contemporary systemic challenges such as global 
surveillance (2016). In particular, this approach would fall short of capturing current threats to 
fundamental rights which are not limited to the relationship between individuals and state actors. 
Current transnational challenges related to global communications systems would require a 
constitutional answer transcending ‘statist and legal-subjectivist reductionism’ (2016: 160). 
From a cursory look at this scholarship, it is apparent that certain themes are recurrent in the analysis 
of the Internet ecosystem from a global constitutionalist perspective: first, the global dimension of 
the Internet context, which requires regulatory solutions transcending the state-centric dimension; 
second, the protection of fundamental rights of individuals also against the threats of private actors; 
and third, the empowerment of the individuals and the simultaneous limitation of powers of the other 
actors.  
Interestingly, all these elements are present in the social media environment as well. Firstly, the social 
media context is characterised by a global dimension, originally not compartmentalised according to 
national boundaries (Mueller 2017). Secondly, social media are not only an extraordinary enabler of 
fundamental rights, in particular of freedom of expression (Jamart 2014; Landemore 2014; Suteu 
2015), but also a means used by individuals, private companies, and states to commit illegal acts and 
threaten these rights (Pelletier 2016; Pollicino 2013; Banks 2010; Nacos 2016; Mitchell et al. 2010). 
Thirdly, in such an environment, individual users have weak mechanisms to counterbalance the 
power of the dominating actors, i.e. states, which maintain their traditional ability to intrude on 
individual fundamental rights (Nixon 2017), social media companies, which have themselves become 
the legislator and the ultimate arbiter of users’ behaviour on their platforms (Jørgensen and Pedersen 
2017; Schneier 2013), and all the other private companies, such as advertisers, which exploit users’ 
personal data to pursue their economic interests (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018). 
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These elements show that the advent of social media, by affecting the protection of fundamental rights 
and the balance of powers, produces an overall alteration of the constitutional relative equilibrium. 
As in Newton’s third law of motion, this general upheaval generates a series of constitutional 
counteractions aimed at restoring a condition of balance. Taking a global constitutional perspective, 
the constitutional answer to face the challenges produced by the advent of social media could arise 
both in a state-centric dimension as well as beyond the state. 
 
4.2 Terms of service and bills of rights as an expression of compensatory constitutionalism 
The constitutional counteraction developed in the state-centric dimension would consist of the 
adoption of legal texts belonging to one of the echelons of the pyramid of legal sources; it would 
primarily take into account the relationship between state and citizens; and it would attempt to 
regulate social media companies by imposing a state’s jurisdiction. An example of this type of 
instrument could be the recently adopted Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, the German ‘Act improving 
law enforcement on social networks’, entered into force on 1st October 2017 (Scally 2017). This act 
imposes on social media companies the duty to remove illegal content from their platforms within 
specified deadlines (Spindler 2017). Despite the fact that the act has been criticised for contrasting 
with EU law (Schulz 2017; Spindler 2017), as well as potentially generating dangerous chilling 
effects to the detriment of freedom of expression (Schulz 2017; Roßmann 2018), the ultimate aim of 
this legislation would be to ensure that content on social media platforms respects German law, 
therefore including individual fundamental rights. 
However, three characteristics of the social media environment, namely its global dimension, the 
presence of private actors threatening individual rights, and the emergence of private companies as 
new dominant power beside states challenge the effectiveness of the constitutional counteractions 
developed at the state-centric level. Traditional constitutional instruments developed at state level do 
not have a global scope of application, and focus on the relationship between state and citizens, 
without fully appreciating the involvement of the powers that operate outside their jurisdiction.  
In similar circumstances, ‘compensatory’ processes of constitutionalisation could emerge beyond the 
state as an answer to the failure of state-centric constitutional mechanisms (Peters 2006). In this case, 
there will be no texts belonging to the traditional hierarchy of norms; the relationship between citizens 
and other actors, such as private companies, would be taken into account; this mechanism would not 
rely on nation-states apparatuses; and it would have a global reach.  
Social media’s terms of service and the bills of rights of social media users seem to reflect these 
characteristics. In this way, a process of constitutionalisation relying on these mechanisms could be 
envisaged as a counteraction to the failure of state-centric constitutional mechanisms to address the 
challenges of the social media environment. In particular, the fact that these kinds of documents focus 
on the relationship between users and social media companies, neglecting that between these actors 
and the state, could suggest that the traditional state-centred constitutionalism is failing to provide 
appropriate solutions in relation to this aspect.  
Finally, if one compares the characteristics of social media’s terms of service and those of the bills 
of rights of social media users, it seems that the latter could be envisioned as a means to compensate 
the shortcomings of social media’s terms of service in relation to the evident lack of democratic 
participation and the intrinsic risk of bias. In this sense, the bills of rights of social media users could 
act as a constitutional counteraction to face the failures of both state-centric constitutionalism and 
social media’s terms of service. 
In conclusion, the possibility to envisage and justify the emergence of a process of 
constitutionalisation, relying on the terms of service and the bills of rights, provides plausibility for 
the hypothesis that the documents considered at the beginning of this paper aspire to act as 
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mechanisms of constitutionalisation in the social media environment, and, to this purpose, they adopt 
a constitutional tone. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The emergence of a constitutional tone in Facebook’s terms of service and in a limited number of 
texts self-defined as bills of rights of social media users generated the question of whether this 
phenomenon could justified as a specific marketing strategy, or it rather reflects an effective, or 
aspirational, constitutional nature of these documents. 
Since a legal inquiry could not completely disentangle the knot of such a dilemma, this paper has 
limited itself to consider a part of the question, namely whether the social media’s terms of service 
and the bills of rights of social media users play, or wish to play, a function of constitutionalisation 
in the social media environment. 
To this purpose, the paper has structured its analysis in two stages. Firstly, it has been shown that, 
from a general point of view, the potential use of social media’s terms of service and bills of rights 
of social media users as mechanisms of constitutionalisation in the social media environment, which 
was envisaged by the scholars who studied these instruments from a constitutional perspective, is in 
fact undermined by a series of significant shortcomings. In this way, one may exclude the emergence 
of a constitutional tone among a limited number of texts as originating from an effective constitutional 
function performed by such documents. 
Secondly, it has been observed that a process of constitutionalisation of the social media environment, 
relying on social media’s terms of service and bills of rights of social media users, could be 
nonetheless theoretically justified, and envisaged in the future. The advent of social media has 
subverted the constitutional equilibrium by significantly affecting individuals’ fundamental rights 
and altering the balance of powers. In line with the theories of global constitutionalism, it has been 
argued that the consequent counteractions that state-centric constitutional instruments are able to 
provide are challenged by the global nature of the social media environment, and by the emergence 
of private corporations as dominant transnational actors.  
In this context, drawing inspiration from Anne Peters’ theory of ‘compensatory constitutionalism’, it 
has been contended that mechanisms of constitutionalisation beyond the state could emerge to 
compensate the failure of state-centric constitutional instruments to face the legal challenges 
generated by the advent of social media. Therefore, the configuration of social media’s terms of 
service and the bills of rights of social media users as mechanisms of constitutionalisation in the 
social media environment could be envisaged as an expression of this compensatory trend. In this 
way, the adoption of a constitutional tone could be regarded as symptomatic of the willingness of 
these documents to play such a compensatory function, and the limited dimension of this phenomenon 
as an evidence of the embryotic state of this process. 
In light of these considerations, future research should monitor the development of constitutional 
counteractions both at state-centric level, and beyond the state. Only in this way, will it be possible 
to understand if, in the coming years, state-centric constitutional instruments will be able to 
effectively protect fundamental rights and balance the existing powers in the global environment of 
social media, or rather a form of ‘multilevel’ constitutional governance will emerge (Cottier and 
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